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Early assessments of the growth rate of COVID-19 were subject to significant
uncertainty, as expected with limited data and difficulties in case ascertain-
ment, but as cases were recorded in multiple countries, more robust
inferences could be made. Using multiple countries, data streams and
methods, we estimated that, when unconstrained, European COVID-19 con-
firmed cases doubled on average every 3 days (range 2.2–4.3 days) and
Italian hospital and intensive care unit admissions every 2–3 days; values
that are significantly lower than the 5–7 days dominating the early published
literature. Furthermore, we showed that the impact of physical distancing
interventions was typically not seen until at least 9 days after implemen-
tation, during which time confirmed cases could grow eightfold. We argue
that such temporal patterns are more critical than precise estimates of the
time-insensitive basic reproduction number R0 for initiating interventions,
and that the combination of fast growth and long detection delays explains
the struggle in countries’ outbreak response better than large values of R0
alone. One year on from first reporting these results, reproduction numbers
continue to dominate the media and public discourse, but robust estimates
of unconstrained growth remain essential for planning worst-case scenarios,
and detection delays are still key in informing the relaxation and re-
implementation of interventions.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early
COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.1. Introduction
In December 2019, a cluster of unexplained pneumonia cases inWuhan, the capi-
tal of Hubei province in the People’s Republic of China, rapidly progressed into a




2World Health Organization [1]. The disease caused by this
highly contagious infection has since been named COVID-19
and is caused by a single-stranded RNA coronavirus (SARS-
CoV-2) similar to the pathogen responsible for severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) andMiddle East respiratory syn-
drome (MERS) [2]. As of 29 March 2020, 657 140 confirmed
cases and 29 957 deaths have been reported in nearly 200
countries and territories globally [3].
Various control measures have been implemented world-
wide, including isolation of confirmed and suspected cases,
contact tracing, and physical distancing. In Hubei, a regional
lockdown was implemented on 23–24 January 2020, with a
peak in reported cases occurring approximately two weeks
later [4]. In Italy, a national lockdown was implemented on
9 March 2020 once 7375 confirmed cases and 366 deaths
had been recorded, with the epidemic appearing to be
slowing down by 29 March [5]. In comparison, India declared
a nationwide lockdown on 24 March 2020, with only 434
confirmed cases and 0 deaths [6,7]. Similarly, South Africa
began a 21-day lockdown on 27 March, with 927 known
cases and 0 deaths [8,9]. Despite the difficulties in evaluating
the real extent of these epidemics owing to under-reporting,
the implementation of such early and aggressive control
measures in India and South Africa may have substantially
increased their chances of successful initial containment,
notwithstanding the social and personal cost [10].
Besides other indicators like disease severity, fatality rate
and hospital occupancy, initial planning of interventions
often relies on estimates of the basic reproduction number
R0. This is defined as the average number of new infections
generated by a single infected person in a fully susceptible
population without control in place and determines the
portion of transmission that needs to be prevented to avoid
spread [11]. Reported estimates of R0 for COVID-19 are
highly variable, ranging from 1.4 to 6.49 [2,12], with most
official sources settling in the range of 2–3 [4,13–16]. How-
ever, the latter estimates mostly derive from early studies of
the epidemic in Wuhan [17–19] or the Diamond Princess
Cruise ship [20], and so are subject to important limitations,
including small amounts of data, limited information on
epidemiological parameters, uncertain or biased reporting
of early cases, and the uniqueness of the specific settings in
which they occurred. We argue that continuous effort
should be devoted to understanding the discrepancies in
published values, and official ranges of R0 should be continu-
ously updated with estimates coming not only from China
[21,22], but also from the many different outbreaks observed
worldwide [23–26]. Point estimates might not change, but the
task remains imperative both because available data become
more numerous and reliable, and because estimates of R0 in
one population do not necessarily translate to another.
However, scientific results should not be summarized
solely as R0 estimates, and policy decisions should not rely
exclusively on R0 as a measure of epidemic spread. First, R0
lacks temporal information related to the speed of epidemic
growth, and hence the optimal timing of interventions
[11,27]. Second, estimates of R0 can vary considerably—and
in particular do so for COVID-19—not only as a reflection
of genuine differences in geography and settings [11],
but also because of how they are calculated: R0 is typically
indirectly derived through mathematical models, with
values varying depending on model structure and estimates
of, or assumptions on, parameter values (e.g. the generationtime distribution or the amount of pre-symptomatic trans-
mission), even when the same data are used for model fits.
While numerous estimates of R0 for COVID-19 exist, real-
time growth rates are much less prominent in the literature
and, where published, lack robustness or are restricted to
single-country analyses on a single dataset [23,28]. We
argue that the real-time growth rate and the delay between
infection and case detection are often more informative
than precise estimates of R0 for initiating interventions.
Unlike R0, they can inform how quickly cases will reach cer-
tain thresholds and hence how long in advance interventions
should be introduced to avoid such thresholds being brea-
ched. Moreover, because doubling times and delays can be
inferred directly from incidence and line-list data, sophisti-
cated models are not required to infer when action is urgent.
We first estimated the growth rate of COVID-19 epidemics,
inmultiple countries andwith different methods, before strong
physical distancing interventions were implemented. We then
estimated the incubation period and the distribution of times
from symptom onset to hospitalization under multiple scen-
arios and in different settings, and compared it with other
results from the literature. Our results show that, in an uncon-
strained epidemic and in the absence of a robust testing
structure, cases can grow eightfold before the effect of any
intervention becomes visible. Observation of the initial out-
breaks in the UK and Italy confirms these results. Finally, we
discuss the limitations of relying solely on R0 as a measure of
epidemic spread.2. Results and discussion
(a) Unconstrained epidemics in Europe doubled on
average every 3 days
For the estimation of the growth rate, we focussed on the
number of confirmed cases in the five most affected European
countries (figure 1a), as reported by the World Health Organ-
ization [29] on 31 March 2020. To avoid relying only on
confirmed cases, which could be affected by numerous
biases, we also estimated the growth rate in Italy from
additional data streams, specifically hospital and intensive
care unit (ICU) bed occupancy and deaths (figure 1b; [30]).
The analysis accounts for the temporal evolution of the
growth rate, with time-varying instantaneous growth rate esti-
mates obtained from a semi-parametric generalized additive
model (GAM), and for changes in reporting by day of the
week (details in the electronic supplementary material). For
all countries and metrics in figure 1, the initial doubling
times (at the end of February for Italy and in early March for
the other countries, whose epidemics started later) varied
between 2 and 3.5 days, with these values increasing over
time owing to the introduction of physical distancing.
For robustness and to ensure generalizability of results, we
performed another analysis on a larger set of European
countries (figure 2) using a generalized linear model (GLM).
An advantage of the GLM is that the resulting point estimates
are easy to interpret as the slope of the line that best fits the data
points on a logarithmic scale. However, these estimates
are highly sensitive to the choice of the fitting window,
especially with small numbers, noisy data, fast growth and
rapid implementation of interventions, sowe identified criteria
for a consistent window choice (figure 2; electronic
























































































Figure 1. Time-varying doubling time from multiple countries and data streams. Instantaneous doubling time (left axis) and growth rate (right axis), with 95%
confidence intervals (CIs, dashed) obtained by fitting a GAM with quasi-Poisson family and canonical link to data, adjusted by day-of-week fixed effect (see the
electronic supplementary material), to (a) daily confirmed cases of the five largest European epidemics since the beginning of March 2020, and (b) different sur-
veillance data streams within Italy since late February 2020. The approximately constant values observed in the early epidemic in each country describe the phase of
unconstrained exponential growth, before physical distancing slowed it down. Notice that the apparent 4-day doubling time for confirmed cases in Italy at the
beginning of March (a) is already higher than the unconstrained doubling time of just over 3 days visible in late February (b). Hospital and ICU daily counts
were obtained from bed occupancy data to provide a fairer comparison in both point estimate and uncertainty with daily confirmed cases and deaths, under





supplementary material). We estimated mean doubling times
before mitigating interventions ranging from 2.2 to 4.3 days,
with an average of just under 3 days across all regions (figure 2)
and slightly less if three (Denmark, Norway and Poland) to six
countries (additionally, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portu-
gal), with less convincing fits, are discarded. These values are
significantly shorter than the 6–7-day estimates obtained from
China [17,31] that dominated the early published literature.
Unsurprisingly, the results obtained with the GAM and the
GLM differ in terms of their confidence intervals, but the con-
clusions are similar and are consistent with a visual
inspection of the data plotted on a logarithmic scale (electronic
supplementary material, figure S4).
Although our results are robust to the method used, they
could still be misleading if there are biases in the data, such as
errors in reporting, changes in case definition or testing
regime, etc. This issue is particularly critical as lags in report-
ing of cases can create discrepancies between national and
international official sources [29,30,32] for case counts. How-
ever, these are unlikely to affect our conclusions owing to the
following considerations:— the fast growth and high numbers probably make small
biases negligible;
— any multiplicative correction, such as constant under-
reporting, does not affect the observed exponential trend;
— in the absence of increasing community testing, the expo-
nential growth of the underlying epidemic process can
easily be underestimated, e.g. if reporting rates decline
over time, but is harder to consistently overestimate.
Aggressive swabbing of asymptomatic individuals (e.g.
early on in the Italian locked-down towns [33]), as well
as changes in case definition [34], might explain such a
bias in the data we analysed, but are unlikely to affectobservations for longer than a few days or consistently
across different countries; and
— hospital and ICU bed occupancy, which in the Italian
data grow at similar rates as the number of confirmed
cases (figure 1b), are less affected by reporting issues.
The observed faster increase in death rates, instead, may
be explained by clustered outbreaks among vulnerable
groups (e.g. care home residents) coupled with quicker
progression to death among these groups, or possibly
local hospital saturation.
We conclude that, although each data stream has limitations,
the evidence for fast exponential growth in the absence of
intervention is compelling.(b) Delay of approximately three doubling times
between infection and case detection
Non-pharmaceutical interventions, with unknown adherence,
cannot be evaluated until their effects emerge in the data.
The delay between infection and case detection is therefore cru-
cial in determining how long the current growth could
continue before the slowdown owing to a newly introduced
intervention becomes visible. Pre-symptomatic detection is dif-
ficult once containment has failed since it relies on extensive
contact tracing and testing of asymptomatic individuals.
Detecting cases at symptomonset ismore feasible, but depends
on the case-finding strategy. For example, from 13March 2020,
symptomatic individuals in the UK have been instructed to
self-isolate at home and are only tested if they subsequently
require hospitalization. Thus, the delay between infection
and case detection includes the incubation period, the time
between symptom onset and hospitalization, and the time
required to receive a positive test result. Similar effects will
Austria: 2.9[2.4,3.6] days
Denmark: 2.6[2.1,3.6] days France: 3.7[3.0,5.0] days Germany: 2.6[2.1,3.2] days
Ireland: 2.3[2.1,2.4] days Italy: 3.0[2.7,3.5] days Luxembourg: 3.4[3.0,3.9] days
Netherlands: 3.4[3.0,4.0] days Norway: 2.3[2.0,2.7] days Poland: 4.3[3.2,6.5] days
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Switzerland: 2.2[1.9,2.5] days UK: 2.3[2.1,2.5] days
Belgium: 3.1[2.4,4.4] days Czechia: 2.5[2.3,2.7] days
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Figure 2. Unconstrained doubling times across Europe. Log daily confirmed cases (red dots) and exponential fit (solid) and 95% CIs (dashed black lines) for all
European countries with more than 1000 cumulative confirmed cases by 27 March, obtained using a GLM (see the electronic supplementary material) in the 9-day
data period after a cumulative incidence of 20 is reached (shaded area). Slight adjustments to Denmark and Romania reflect their particular circumstances (see the





be visible in other countries where case counts are dominated
by hospitalizations.
We report published estimates of the incubation period and
the delay between symptom onset and hospitalization (table 1).
Because none of these estimates simultaneously account for
truncated observations and exponential growth in the number
of infected cases,we also includeourownestimates (see the elec-
tronic supplementary material and [41]) obtained by analysingUK line-list data provided by Public Health England (unfortu-
nately not publicly available) and a publicly available line-list
which collates worldwide data [38]. Our estimates are more
robust but broadly consistent with the existing literature, and
highlight geographical heterogeneity, such as shorter onset-to-
hospitalization intervals in Hong Kong and Singapore com-
pared to the UK. With the exception of Singapore, the sum of
the mean incubation period and mean onset-to-hospitalization
(b)(a)
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9 days to visible effects of
interventions
5/3 school closure
9 days to visible effects of
interventions
13/3 self-isolation if symptomatic
23/02 01/03 08/03 15/03 22/03 29/03 23/02 01/03 08/03 15/03 22/03 29/03
Figure 3. Observed deviation from unconstrained exponential growth approximately 9 days after the first publicly announced nationwide intervention. Daily con-
firmed cases in (a) the UK and (b) Italy before intervention (circles) are fitted with a GLM with 95% negative binomial prediction intervals around the central
estimate (dashed red lines; see the electronic supplementary material). Crosses are data not used for fitting. Maximum-likelihood estimates of growth rates
and doubling times, with asymptotic 95% CIs, are reported above each panel.







incubation period 4.8 — 2.2–7.4 16 [35]
incubation period 5.6 3.9 4.4–7.4 52 [36]
incubation period 6.4 2.3 5.6–7.7 88 [37]
incubation period 4.85 2.79 — 162 electronic supplementary material
(Data – [38])
onset to confirmation 4.8 3.03 — 38 [39]
onset to hospitalization 5 — — — [40]
onset to hospitalization (dead) 6.6 — 5.2–8.8 34 [36]
onset to hospitalization (alive) 9.7 — 5.4–17 155 [36]
onset to hospitalization (UK) 5.14 4.20 — 90 electronic supplementary material
(Data - PHE)
onset to hospitalization (Singapore) 2.62 2.38 — 92 electronic supplementary material
(Data - [38])
onset to hospitalization (Hong
Kong)






interval is never shorter than 9 days, which corresponds to
approximately three doubling times in an unconstrained epi-
demic like those observed in figures 1 and 2.
Our estimates of doubling time and delay between infec-
tion and detection are consistent with observations of the
UK and Italian epidemics (figure 3). For both countries,
after the first substantial national-scale intervention was
implemented, the number of daily confirmed cases sustained
the pre-intervention exponential growth for about 9 days,
before deviating from the predicted trajectory. After thefirst control measure in the UK (recommended self-isolation
if symptomatic from 13 March, figure 3a), cases continued
to increase exponentially with an estimated growth rate of
approximately 0.24 d−1 (corresponding to a doubling time
of just under 3 days) for 9 days. During this period the
number of daily confirmed cases rose approximately eight-
fold. A similar pattern was observed in Italy (nationwide
school closure imposed on 5 March, although local lock-
downs were imposed and universities in Northern Italy
were closed between 22 and 23 February, figure 3b).
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rs
6Owing to the delay between implementing interventions
and observing their effects in the data, a pattern of introduc-
tions of increasingly strong measures has repeated across
Europe, with long delays to control. Even with immediate
hard interventions halting all community transmission,
within-household transmission will continue to occur, creat-
ing an additional delay between the implementation of the
intervention and observing its effect. This is consistent with
the approximate two-week delay from lockdown to peak
in new cases observed in Hubei [4]. Further delays in hospi-
tal/ICU bed occupancy and deaths mean the latter figures
keep on growing well after transmission control is achieved. tb
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
376:20200264(c) R0 estimates quoted in isolation have limited value
Because R0 remains the mainstay of most epidemiological
analyses, we explored values of R0 consistent with a range
of growth rates and modelling assumptions. For a growth
rate of 0.25 d−1 and our estimates of the incubation period
(table 1), we obtained values ranging from 2 to 5 (electronic
supplementary material, table S1a), owing to the extreme
sensitivity to assumptions, in particular the extent of
pre-symptomatic transmission, for which estimates in the
literature vary widely [42–45]. Conversely, the same R0 can
be derived from different growth rates, if different generation
times are assumed. For this reason, R0 values can be mislead-
ing if quoted in isolation: for example, a value of R0 of 2.2 was
estimated in [31] from a doubling time of 7.4 days and
relatively long SARS-based generation times (assumed in
the absence of reliable information), but the same numerical
value could be obtained with a shorter and more front-
loaded infectivity profile (e.g. from electronic supplementary
material, table S1a, gamma-shaped infectivity with mean 2
days and 2 days of pre-symptomatic transmission) and an
epidemic that is growing more than twice as fast (e.g. from
electronic supplementary material, table S1a, a growth rate
of 0.2 d−1, corresponding to a doubling time of 3.47 days).
Although R0 determines the reduction in person-to-person
transmission needed to achieve control, this brings limited
insight into the early response to COVID-19. The challenge
in measuring the amount of pre-symptomatic transmission
translates into uncertain quantification of most likely R0
values even when derived from the same growth rate (elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S1a). Moreover, with
substantial pre-symptomatic transmission, the exact value of
R0 only poorly correlateswith the feasibility of infection control
[46]. For example, if R0 = 4 and all transmission occurs after
symptoms onset, self-isolation when symptomatic can achieve
the required 75% fall in transmission. Conversely, if R0 = 2
but most transmission is pre-symptomatic, unless a solid
infrastructure is in place to rapidly detect and isolate
pre-symptomatic individuals, the required 50% drop in trans-
mission can only be achieved through interventions, like
mass quarantine of apparently healthy individuals, that are
highly socially disruptive and probably enforced rather than
spontaneous. Finally, R0 informs how much transmission
shouldbe averted, but not howquickly this should be achieved.
Ultimately, neither R0 nor the growth rate can inform the
choice of intervention, because of uncertainty in the nature
and proximity of contacts necessary for transmission, the
challenges in quantifying the risk of transmission through
indirect routes (e.g. fomites) and, not least, unpredictable
levels of adherence. Such uncertainties on the impact ofbehavioural changes, further coupled with extremely variable
R0 estimates, probably result in the need for a major reassess-
ment of intervention strategies after their implementation.
With long delays to observing the effect of interventions
and a concurrent fast growth, proper, data-driven, reassess-
ment is feasible only after a long enough period of time,
during which detected cases can grow substantially (figure 3).
If, at that point, more stringent measures are necessary, they
will require further time to show an effect, while cases con-
tinue to grow. Immediate action, when cases are low, can
grant enough margin for informed reassessment without
overwhelming the healthcare system. In planning interven-
tions, growth rate and delays to detection are more suitable
than R0 to provide guidance on such temporal details.3. Conclusion
The highlighted risks of underestimating the combination of
short doubling times and long delays between infection and
case detection are consistent with the now-common pattern
of countries misjudging the initial small number of observed
cases, only to realize the storm has already arrived. With
cases largely being confirmed only when hospitalized, after
the introduction of interventions, epidemic growth will be
sustained for at least a full infection-to-hospitalization delay
before their effect is observed. With unconstrained growth,
our estimates mean that cases can grow more than eightfold
during this period and, if the healthcare system risks being
overwhelmed, even the extreme effort of doubling hospital
capacity only buys 3 days of reprieve. Although R0 is valu-
able for quantifying the fraction of transmission that should
be prevented to control the epidemic, estimates of R0 reported
or quoted in isolation can be misleading, in particular when
similar values are obtained from very different growth rates
and modelling assumptions. This issue is particularly relevant
in the case of COVID-19, where scientific andmedia communi-
cations overly focussed on R0 may have contributed in
distracting the attention from epidemic growth with doubling
times that were significantly shorter than those dominating the
early published literature. We advocate stronger action from
national and international healthcare communities, with a par-
ticular focus on supporting low- and middle-income countries
where numbers of cases, at the time of writing (end of March
2020), appeared to be relatively low. In settings where health-
care capacity is low and intergenerational mixing common,
swift action can save numerous lives.Addendum
Ouroriginal analysiswas uploaded as open-access preprints on
31 March [47] and 15 April 2020 [48]. The medRxiv version [48]
was updated on 11 June 2020 to reflect comments from
reviewers, including revised figures, concepts clarification
and a discussion update to make the paper more relevant to
the situation in June. In line with the spirit of this special
issue collating analyses that have shaped COVID-19 policy in
the UK, here we have tried to remain as close as possible to
the sentiments expressed in the original version, including the
call for action we advocated at the time. However, we have
retained the revised analysis from [48] (plus a further correction


































1 Feb 1 Mar 1 Apr 1 May 1 June 1 July
1 Feb 1 Mar 1 Apr 1 May 1 June 1 July
Asian estimates (peer-reviewed)
other estimates (peer-reviewed)
other estimates (not peer-reviewed)
other assumptions (peer-reviewed)
other assumptions (not peer-reviewed)
estimates from this work (figure 2)
Asian estimates (not peer-reviewed)
(b)
(a)
Figure 4. Estimates of (a) unconstrained (or early) doubling time, and (b) basic (or early) reproduction number published in the first half of 2020, by date of
publication. The size of the marker indicates the number of Google Scholar citations recorded between 31 March and 1 April 2021. Publications with fewer than 100
citations are not shown, with the exception of the estimates presented in this paper (green squares). Filled markers denote peer-reviewed publications and empty
markers preprints or other reports. Circle markers denote estimates obtained from data (whether made available or not) and crosses are values presented as assump-
tions or statements with no clear source. Blue colour denotes publications using data from, or presenting results for, countries in Asia, while yellow is used for all
other countries. Publications have been extracted from Google Scholar between 31 March and 1 April 2021, with searches [(‘doubling time’ OR ‘growth rate’) AND
(covid OR SARS-CoV-2)] and [‘basic reproduction number’ AND (covid OR SARS-CoV-2)]. The resulting filtered list is available at https://github.com/thomasallan
house/covid19-growth. Longer doubling time estimates and low reproduction numbers dominated the cited literature at the time of first submission (a citation
count collected on 18 April 2020 for the most cited publications in this figure resulted in fewer citations, but in broadly similar proportions, thus providing
the same qualitative picture—not shown), and still dominate it now. Although longer doubling times observed in Asia could in principle be attributable to a
different variant [53], short doubling times were also obtained from China, both early on (e.g. in January 2020 by Read et al. [54], also published in this Special





reviewed published versions where appropriate. The con-
clusions have not changed throughout.
Since our original preprint, evidence has emerged confir-
ming the link between early interventions and lower mortality
[49–51], and our statement that mass quarantining would be
followed by a wave of within-household transmission has
later been verified [52].
Despite a broad range of initial doubling time estimates
reported between January and March of 2020, early estimates
[17,31] or assumptions [40] at the higher end of the spectrum
(5–7 days) dominated the literature at the time of submission
and still dominate it today (figure 4). The limited duration ofthe period of unconstrained growth and the noisiness of data
collected early on in each country call for a robust analysis
making use of multiple data streams (in particular, hospital
and ICU data, which are less affected by reporting biases
than confirmed cases) and comparing multiple countries.
With very few exceptions [55–57], little work has since been
published with levels of robustness similar to those in this
study. However, highly visible robust analyses are essential,
both owing to their direct importance for informing govern-
ment response, but also because crucial work on e.g.
severity estimates, scenario planning, and control policies




8In this study, we also highlighted potential problems
arising from using R0 estimates in isolation, or comparing
them directly between different studies. The published litera-
ture has been awash with estimates of R0, obtained from a
plethora of data sources and often subsequently cited with-
out discussion of the underpinning technical details and
assumptions. In addition to the data and method of choice,
estimates of R0 are sensitive to assumptions on the serial
interval, generation time and pre-symptomatic transmission
[42,43,58,59]. The broad range of estimates, from 0.48 to
14.8 [60], underscores the magnitude of the problem. The
fact that peer-reviewed publications discussing these details
have only become available towards the end of 2020 [61]
highlights the limited attention this topic has received.
Even though our analysis focussed on the early stage of the
pandemic, the conclusions remain important. First, ourestimates
of the unconstrained growth rate are essential to planworst-case
scenarios and calibrate models guiding both the relaxation and
the re-implementation of interventions. Second, recognizing
detection delays can help to avoid overconfidence in epidemic
control when interventions are relaxed: new infections can
build up unnoticed for several days while detected cases
appear to be consistently decreasing. Similarly, when interven-
tions are tightened, there will be a delay between the new
control policies and seeing their effect in the data. Ideally,
delays should be minimized by implementing significant levels
of community testing of asymptomatic as well as symptomatic
individuals, and intervals between changes in interventions
should be long enough to allow for assessment of their impact.
A final key message of our work is the unnecessary predo-
minance of reproduction numbers in the scientific and public
discourse. Although growth rate estimates are now regularly
published [62] and visualized [63], reproduction numbers
still appear to receive the highest emphasis from public
health officials, policy makers and the media. For the most
part, estimates of the current reproduction number are used
to assess whether new interventions are having the desired
effect (i.e. reproduction numbers are decreasing over time)
or whether local or national epidemics are brought under con-
trol (i.e. reproduction numbers are falling below one), even
though the same signal could be read by just observing
whether the data are growing more slowly over time, or are
reversing their trend from growth to decay.
In conclusion, COVID-19 short doubling times highlight
the importance of careful evaluation of time indicators
together with the time-insensitive reproduction numbers.
These aspects cannot be underestimated especially in the
context of new, unknown, emerging infectious diseases and
high uncertainty in parameter values and reproduction
number estimates. Besides the speed of growth, a careful
evaluation of infection-to-detection delays is crucial for plan-
ning the implementation and relaxation of non-
pharmaceutical interventions, to anticipate when they will
take effect and allow for margins to measure their impact
and, if needed, re-asses planned strategies.In context
How this analysis shaped policy
The first key result in this paper, namely that numbers of con-
firmed COVID-19 cases in the UK were doubling
approximately every 3 days, with similar rates in otherEuropean countries (specifically, figure S4 in the electronic
supplementary material and a preliminary version of
figure 3a), was presented to the Scientific Pandemic Influenza
group on Modelling (SPI-M) on 20 March 2020.
The context in which these estimates were made is illus-
trated in figure 4. At the time, estimates of the basic
reproduction number and the unconstrained growth rate of
SARS-CoV-2, obtained predominantly using data from
China, varied widely. However, some of these appeared
only in non-peer-reviewed preprints (including those from
Read et al. [54], published in this issue), with the discourse
dominated by estimates coming from the most established
epidemic modelling groups and the highest-impact journals.
In line with these, the consensus of the Scientific Advisory
Group for Emergencies (SAGE) at the time was on a doubling
time of around 5–6 days1,2 and a UK epidemic lagging 2–4
weeks behind the Italian one3.
Our estimates were not the only ones presented at the SPI-
M meeting on 20 March: a preliminary analysis from Public
Health England’s Joint Modelling Team, based on the then
scarce and rapidly changing confirmed cases and deaths in
England, also estimated a 3-day doubling time. What made
our analysis particularly robust was the comparison between
confirmed cases from multiple countries with similar social
structures to the UK and the use of hospital and ICU data
from Italy, as these data streams suffer from fewer biases
compared to confirmed cases and deaths (see §2). With two
independent analyses pointing in the same direction at the
meeting, SAGE’s consensus estimates were rapidly revised.
A second analysis presented at the same meeting by the
authors additionally evidenced that the UK epidemic was
lagged by two weeks compared to the Italian one, firmly at
the low end of the SAGE’s consensus range at the time.
Although the pressure for further interventions was
mounting and a lockdown was becoming unavoidable,
awareness of the speed of spread provided key evidence in
the decision-making process that led to the closure of pubs
and restaurants the same day.
At the SPI-M meeting on 23 March 2020, we presented a
report detailing the second key result in this paper, namely
the unavoidable delay of at least 9 days between interven-
tions and observing their effect in the data. Coupled with
the 3-day doubling time, this meant that, even with immedi-
ate intervention, hospital and ICU bed projections would
likely pass the target limits set out by the NHS at the time.
These analyses made it clear that decisions had to be taken
immediately, before assessing the effect of the previous clo-
sure of hospitality venues, thus providing key evidence
supporting the first national lockdown coming into force
the next day.Struggles with peer-review publication process
Given the international importance of our results, we tempor-
arily interrupted the modelling work in support of the UK
response and instead aimed for rapid, peer-reviewed, publi-
cation [47]. The choice of the journal was not
straightforward, and particularly acute was the awareness
that the race for first publication and for highest impact jour-
nals was at least partially responsible for the dominance of
longer doubling time estimates in the cited literature. Never-
theless, the assurance of rapid review, immediate sharing of




9the potential for our results to support a decisive pandemic
response in other countries, were the deciding factors for sub-
mission to a high-impact journal. Unfortunately, the review
process took a month, and the paper was rejected as the
results, albeit valued as scientifically robust, were perceived
to be insufficiently novel and not changing the understanding
of SARS-CoV-2 spread at the time.
Although we agreed that by April 2020 an expert in the
field might not have been surprised by the main results of
the paper, we appealed on the basis that (i) the key messages,
together with the discussion of the relevant merits of R0 and
the growth rate as indicators of viral spread, were of continued
importance for policy makers and general audiences,
especially in a context of rapidly changing interventions, and
(ii) the publication offered robust multi-country, multi-data-
stream estimates, and hence filled a gap in the referenceable
literature. After an invitation to resubmit, we re-drafted the
paper in light of the new prevailing questions faced by govern-
ments worldwide, highlighting the relevance of our estimates
for relaxing non-pharmaceutical interventions while
preventing cases from accumulating unnoticed ([48]; see
Addendum). The manuscript was again rejected based on it
being outdated and the inconsistency of discussing reopening
while analysing data about the unconstrained growth phase.
Our experience epitomizes some of the key issues associ-
ated with the need for rapid but rigorous scientific publishing
in an emergency. Many of these issues have been experienced
by the authors of other papers in this Special Issue, raising
important questions:
— How rigorous should a scientific analysis be under time
constraints? Rapid analyses can be done – the fast growth
in cases in the UK and abroad in March 2020 was clear
from simple data visualizations—yet governments may be
unwilling to act based on non-peer-reviewed results. A
publishable and rigorous scientific analysis, complete with
uncertainty quantification and discussion of the potential
biases, requires time, but if the results are similar to those
already in the public domain they may be judged to be
insufficiently novel for publication.
— When should a scientific result be considered ‘well
known’ and hence not worth publishing? In a pandemic,
understanding of the situation can change rapidly, and
the situation itself will likely differ by regions. Results
that one person (such as an expert reviewer sitting on
the same committees) may be aware of, could be of
extreme interest and importance to others.
— To whom should scientific publications be targeted?
Straightforward arguments expressing key concepts
could be extremely useful for policy makers, but not
novel to experts. Conversely, complex analyses might be
scientifically novel but not offer sufficient clarity upon
which policy makers can act.
— How can timely, visible, publication be ensured? The per-
ceived value of a potential publication is by definition
subjective, and reviewers can effectively block publication
on this basis. Under normal circumstances, a rejection is dis-
appointing, and typically leads to re-submission to a
different journal. However, in the context of a rapidly chan-
ging pandemic situation, a rejection delays the utility of the
research and could render it effectively unpublishable. For
example, modelling investigations used to explore scenariosand informpolicy decisions in the absence ofdata, thoughof
general interest, are bound to become outdated once more
data are available or the decisions they contributed to have
been taken. Furthermore, the same researchers may have
limited capacity to revise and resubmit previous research
as the attention shifts to new policy asks.
These issues are particularly acute when transparency in
the scientific evidence leading to policy choices is demanded
by the public, but scientific publications and citation counts,
rather than policy impact, ultimately drive the award of
research funding—including short-term funding needed to
respond to the crisis. Processes enabling rapid peer-review
have been proposed4 and trialled5 [64], but are currently in
their infancy. Alternative publication models, based on
immediate online access and transparent peer review (e.g.
F1000Research, Wellcome Open Research, eLife), that could
partially address these problems also exist, but are not yet
widespread.
The critical role of early estimates and their revision
By placing our paper in context, we also hope to raise aware-
ness of the risks associated with the need for rapid
dissemination of results based on limited data. In particular,
early estimates published in high-impact journals can have
high visibility that is amplified as later studies refer to
them. If erroneous—which is more likely in a system where
the reward is skewed in favour of being the first published
estimates, sometimes at the cost of scientific robustness—
these estimates can have substantial negative consequences
for policy decisions. Clear communication of uncertainty,
unavoidable with limited early data, is crucial and should
be aided when possible by baseline agreed-upon standards
and protocols for ‘week 0’ data analysis. Similarly, increased
data availability and transparency should enable critical and
constructive cross-checking of results by different research
groups.
A system that rewards confirmatory or updated analyses
and the gathering of robust scientific evidence, and that sup-
ports the scientists doing this work, should be a fundamental
principle in future pandemics and public emergencies.
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